Paradoxical patronalism: Assessing regionalism as a factor in Ukraine's democratisation

15 December 2025

Sierra Salazar

This post assesses the factor of regionalism in Ukraine's transformation into a democratic state. It discusses patronal politics[1] (Hale, 2015), obstacles to democratic consolidation (Way, 2016), and, paradoxically, regionalism's role as a "helpful counterweight" against a full-blown consolidation of a power vertical as seen in Belarus and Russia (Sasse, 2010; Minakov, 2019).

This short analysis will proceed in three overarching parts. First, it begins with an overview of how these regional clans were formed in the Soviet period by drawing on the works of Mykhailo Minakov (2019) and Nataliya Kibita (2024). Second, it proceeds to a brief examination of politics and regionalism in the early years of Ukraine's independence-focusing on the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-1999; 1999-2004). Lastly, it concludes with assessments of how regionalism has played a paradoxical role in being both an obstacle to and a driver of democratisation.

Soviet-era historical roots of regional clans

The emergence of regional clans began not with perestroika or the political and economic crises of the 1990s, but can rather be traced back to Stalin's consolidation of power. As Minakov (2019) argues, the prohibition of factions in the CPSU under Joseph Stalin encouraged Soviet elites to organise around regional units instead. These were not well-defined groups but rather informal units (p. 222). As Kibita demonstrates the postwar reconstruction of Soviet Ukraine fueled the reemergence of these regional clans as funding was poured in from the center and competition flourished (Kibita, 2024; Minakov, 2019). 

During the postwar reconstruction, the most intense competition centered around Kharkiv, Stalino (Donets'k), and Dnipropetrovs'k. Although regional clans were informal, they became the backbone of the late Soviet political order, and sentiments of a regional identity were forged within the local party units and educational centers (p. 225).

Regional clans & compounding crises: the 1990s and Leonid Kravchuk

When the Soviet Union collapsed, regional clans seamlessly transferred their power into the newly independent state, adapting nomenklatura habits to the new realities of privatisation. The economic crisis of 1993-1994 saw yet another boom of regional clan politics (Kibita, 2019, p. 5). As Kibita states, the clans"grew sufficiently strong to dictate the development of a political system that Minakov dubbed as 'the republic of clans.'" (Kibita, 2019, p. 5).

Regional clan conflict was mediated by president Leonid Kravchuk, who remained"wedded to a very Soviet style of politics - clientelism, government as compromise between elites, divide and rule, the kompromat of opponents and an aversion to viewing either the state or political parties as arenas of public accountability rather than a battleground for personal or group interests" (Wilson, 2015, p. 183).

The importance of regionalism became particularly evident during the economic and political crises of the early 1990s, marked by miners' strikes in the Donbas and the escalating rivalry between President Leonid Kravchuk and Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. After Kuchma's resignation in September 1993, Yukhym Zvyahilsky (director of the Zasyadko coal mine and a prominent member of the Donets'k clan) was appointed as acting prime minister. Although the Kravchuk-Kuchma rivalry goes far beyond the scope of this short analysis, it has been noted as a critical moment in regime divergence between Ukraine and Russia, as it did not end with force as in Russia during the 1993 constitutional crisis but rather an election in 1994 where Leonid Kuchma won against Kravchuk in the second round (Popova & Shevel, 2024, p. 58-63). 

The Kuchma Years: A Multi-Pyramid Patronal Network 

Leonid Kuchma's presidency (1994-2004) institutionalised the regional clans. The Presidential Administration played-like under Kravchuk-a mediating role as the "decision-making center of the adopted political family" (Minakov, 2019, p. 232). Drawing on his Dnipropetrovs'k network, Kuchma built what Hale (2010, p. 85) describes as a "pyramid of power," or the power vertical. As Minakov (2019, p. 230-233) notes, the Dnipropetrovs'k and Donets'k clans came to dominate national politics at the time, and their rivalry sustained a form of pluralistic or "competitive" authoritarianism that depended on the president's ability to balance a multi-pyramid patronal network (p. 233). Yet this same regional balancing mechanism, which Sasse (2010, p. 103-105) identifies as a safeguard against authoritarian consolidation, fractured when Kuchma's system overreached into attempting a vertical of power. The "political machine" built during Kuchma's presidency split in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, when mass mobilisation erupted against electoral fraud (Hale 2010). Rather than further entrench the competitive authoritarianism of the 1990s, the Orange Revolution entrenched democratic institutions and a balance of powers (Popova & Shevel 2024, p. 6). A decade later, Yanukovych's renewed attempt to consolidate power (indeed steering Ukraine into authoritarianism once more) with his Party of Regions ended with his ouster during the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests.
 

Conclusion

Regionalism has played a paradoxical role, in terms of Ukraine's democratic path in the early years of independence. It has simultaneously delayed democratic reform and served as a counterweight to authoritarian consolidation-especially if compared to Ukraine's northern and eastern neighbors where a strong power vertical emerged (Sasse 2010). Rooted in Soviet-era regional groups that formed in the aftermath of the CPSU's prohibition of factions (oppositions), these networks persisted through the twentieth century and grew especially strong in major industrial centers (Dnipropetrovs'k, Stalino/Donets'k, and Kharkiv) in the wake of mass state funding of a Soviet Ukraine devastated by World War II. At the beginning of Ukraine's independence, this same 'pluralism' fragmented power and prevented authoritarian consolidation. Although Ukraine turned towards authoritarianism at the end of Kuchma's first term and throughout his second, authoritarianism failed to take hold following the entrenchment of democratic institutions after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Ukraine's enduring regionalism before 2014 was a counterweight against extremes at the beginning of the country's post-Soviet transition, giving space for democratic institutions (however imperfect) to take hold.
 

Bibliography

Gorchinskaya, K. (2020, May 14). A brief history of corruption in Ukraine: The Kravchuk era. Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/a-brief-history-of-corruption-in-ukraine-the-kravchuk-era

Hale, H. E. (2010). Ukraine: The Uses of Divided Power. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 84-98. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0174

Hale, H. E. (2015). Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

Kibita, N. (2024). The institutional foundations of Ukrainian democracy: Power sharing, regionalism, and authoritarianism. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191925351.001.0001

Minakov, M. (2019). Republic of Clans: The evolution of the Ukrainian political system. In B. Magyar (Ed.), Stubborn Structures (pp. 217-246). Central European University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789633862155-009

Popova, M., & Shevel, O. (2024). Russia and Ukraine: Entangled histories, diverging states. polity.

Sasse, G. (2010). Ukraine: The Role of Regionalism. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 99-106.

Way, L. (2016). Democracy and Governance in Divided Societies. In Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative perspectives on advancing reform in Ukraine. Stanford University Press.